

UNCLASSIFIED

|   |              |
|---|--------------|
| AD NUMBER   |              |
| AD393832  |              |
| CLASSIFICATION CHANGES  |              |
| TO:   | UNCLASSIFIED |
| FROM:   | CONFIDENTIAL |
| LIMITATION CHANGES  |              |
| TO:<br>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.  |              |
| FROM:<br>DTIC Classified Users Only. Controlling DoD Organization: Army Assistant Chief of Staff of Force Development, Washington, DC 20310. 20 Feb 1967. Document partially illegible. |              |
| AUTHORITY   |              |
| AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980  |              |

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD393832

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO:

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM:

SECRET

AUTHORITY

31 OCT 1978, dodd 5200.10 gp-3

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED  
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND  
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON  
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

# **SECURITY**

---

# **MARKING**

**The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.**

**Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.**

---

**THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.**

**NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.**

**Best  
Available  
Copy**

**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



18  
**OACSFOR**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (27 Feb 67) FOR **OT-RD-660321** 2 March 1967

SUBJECT: **Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 2D Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery (11)48**

TO:

9  
SEE DISTRIBUTION

Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 Oct 67.

NOV 25 1967

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2D Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*C. A. Stanfiel*  
**C. A. STANFIEL**  
Colonel, AGC

Acting The Adjutant General

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Commanding General  
US Army Combat Development Command  
US Continental Army Command  
Commandants  
US Army Command and General Staff College  
US Army War College  
US Army Air Defense School  
US Army Artillery and Missile School  
US Army Armor School  
US Army Chemical Corps School  
US Army Engineer School  
US Army Military Police School  
US Army Infantry School  
US Army Intelligence School  
US Army Medical Field Service School  
US Army Ordnance School

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
WHEN SEPARATED FROM  
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

DDC CONTROL

NO. 41341

2702658

R35

**SECRET**

FOROT RD  
660321

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Section 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

AD393832

FILE COPY

Incl  
a/s

003650

**SECRET**

**DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)**

US Army Quartermaster School  
US Army Security Agency School  
US Army Signal School  
US Army Transportation School  
US Army Special Warfare School  
US Army Civil Affairs School

SIGN FOR

WHITE SECTION

DIFF SECTION

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

INSTRUCTION/AVAILABILITY CODE

| DIST. | AVAIL. and/or SPECIAL |
|-------|-----------------------|
| 9     |                       |

**SECRET**

12 70 263  
125000

**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 2D HOWITZER BATTALION, 35TH ARTILLERY  
APO US Forces 96257

AVAC-V

31 October 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Reports for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,  
RCS-CSFOR-65(U)

THRU: Commanding Officer  
54th Artillery Group  
Attn: AVGG-C  
APO 96257

Commanding Officer  
II Field Forces Vietnam Artillery  
Attn: ~~AVGPA-C~~ AVIFB - FAC  
APO 96227

Commanding General  
USARV  
Attn: AVC-DH  
APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief  
USARPAC  
Attn: GPOP-MH  
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Forces Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, DC, 20310

downgraded at 8 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years  
DOD DIR 5200.10

**SECRET**

NO. 1341



# SECRET

## SECTION I

### 1. (S) Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

a. Administration/Personnel. None

b. Intelligence. None

c. Training.

(1) A general training program directive has been formulated and will be published as a memorandum on 1 November 1966. This memorandum provides guidance for replacement and refresher training for all personnel. In order to standardize policy concerning cannon gunnery and emphasize safety precautions, a circular on gunnery procedures will also be published 1 November 1966.

(2) Aerial observers have completed training and currently conduct visual reconnaissance, registrations and fire missions. Additional personnel are receiving cross training in this field.

(3) On 22 October 1966, four officers and ten enlisted men of this battalion departed for 10 days TDY to Headquarters EUSA, Korea, for nuclear weapons refresher training.

(4) On the job training and individual cross training continues in all sections of the battalion.

d. Operations.

(1) On 200001 October 1966, the 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery was reassigned from the 23rd Artillery Group to the 54th Artillery Group by USARV General Order Number 6111, 1966.

(2) HQ, B, and C Batteries continued General Support/Reinforcing of the 10th ARVN Division from the Xuan Loc base camp, Battery A continued General Support/Reinforcing of the Australian Task Force from the Nui Dat base camp, and Service Battery (-) continued its support mission from Long Binh. The only change in the disposition of battalion elements was the move of the battalion personnel section from the 23rd Artillery Group consolidated personnel section at Long Binh to the 54th Artillery Group consolidated personnel section at Long Binh.

(3) During the quarter, elements of the battalion participated in nine different field operations with the following breakdown by battery: Battery A, five operations involving a total of 31 days; battery B, three operations, 68 days; Battery C, 3 operations, 47 days. A battalion HQ element accompanied B Battery on Operation Toledo for 13 days. While not engaged in field operations, all batteries continued normal training, maintenance and area improvement and provided fire support from their base camps.

**SECRET**

3  
d. Operations: (Con't)

(4) The first field operation for the battalion occurred 1-2 August when Battery B moved out in general support of units from the 10th ARVN Division operating to the southwest of Xuan Loc and out of range of the base camp. The battery occupied one firing position and fired H&I's and a preparation before returning to the base camp. The operation was primarily useful in familiarizing the battalion with road march problems and artillery support procedures for ARVN units.

(5) From 14 August - 7 September the battalion provided general support for Operation Toledo which was conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade and attached units. Participating units of this battalion were attached to the 3rd Battalion, 319th Artillery, of the 173rd. Batteries moved out separately to a series of positions east and south of Xuan Loc in support of search and destroy infantry sweeps. Both batteries fired extensive H&I's and LZ preparations. However, there were very few observed missions and no significant surveillance of results.

(6) On 9 September B Battery was attached to the 1st Infantry Division and moved to Lai Khe for a series of operations. At the end of October the battery was still attached in a General Support/Reinforcing role, making this the largest operation in which the battalion has participated.

(7) Battery C was again attached to the 3/319th Artillery with the 173rd Airborne Brigade from 25 September - 17 October for Operation Sioux City and Robin. For Sioux City, the battery occupied a position 25km north of Bien Hoa and supported search and destroy sweeps within Artillery range. The battery then moved back to Bien Hoa and down Highway 15 in support of a road clearing operation carried out by elements of the 173rd Airborne and the 11th Armored Cavalry. Battery A also participated in this operation. No enemy contact was made and only routine missions were fired.

(8) In addition to Robin, Battery A took part in the following operations during the three month period: Holsworthy, 10-14 August; Crow's Nest, 1-3 October; Canbery I, 6-10 October; and Queenbeyan, 16-26 October. These search and destroy operations were all conducted by the 1st Australian Task Force and involved moving only part of the firing battery to the field while the rest continued its fire support mission from the battery base camp at Nui Dat.

(9) Ammunition expenditures for this quarter were as follows:

|           | <u>August</u> |             | <u>September</u> |             | <u>October</u> |             |
|-----------|---------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
|           | <u>Mns</u>    | <u>Rds</u>  | <u>Mns</u>       | <u>Rds</u>  | <u>Mns</u>     | <u>Rds</u>  |
| Battery A | 240           | 1428        | 187              | 1954        | 415            | 1499        |
| Battery B | 426           | 2741        | 718              | 4960        | 489            | 7720        |
| Battery C | <u>527</u>    | <u>3001</u> | <u>234</u>       | <u>3817</u> | <u>551</u>     | <u>1799</u> |
| Sub-Total | 1,193         | 7,170       | 1,139            | 10,731      | 1,455          | 11,018      |

Battalion Total: 3,787 Missions; 28,919 Rounds Expended

**SECRET**

# SECRET

## SECTION II

### Commander's Observations and Recommendations

#### Part 1. Observations:

- a. Personnel. None
- b. Operations.

#### Discouragement of VC Road Mine Laying

ITEM: Use of artillery to assist in keeping roads clear.

DISCUSSION: On operation Sioux City, in which one of our batteries participated, it became increasingly apparent that daytime road clearing operations only temporarily removed obstacles from the path of friendly forces. At night new mines and booby traps were emplaced. Therefore, artillery H&I missions were fired using fuze VT and shell HE on unoccupied portions of roads and shell HE and WP rounds with PD fuzes on both sides of roads.

OBSERVATION: Although this procedure did not completely halt the emplacement of mines and booby traps, it did cause a significant reduction in the number of new obstacles introduced. The use of fuze VT on the unoccupied portion of the roads provided a deterrent, while not subjecting the road to damage. On two occasions partially installed mines were discovered in the vicinity of previous night H&I fires. Apparently the artillery frightened the VC away before they could finish the job.

#### Artillery H&I Fires

ITEM: Artillery H&I fires in depth.

DISCUSSION: The common practice for artillery H&I missions is to plan a given number of rounds, a given number of times, on one set of coordinates. These are almost totally unobserved fires into suspected areas or supply routes and are based on current intelligence without confirmation.

OBSERVATION: A systematic coverage of an area rather than firing at a given point will greatly enhance the possibility of damage and injury to the VC.

#### Artillery Air Warning Notification

ITEM: Establishment of one standard air warning net.

DESCRIPTION: In order to properly effect aircraft notification of artillery firing, this battalion has to provide firing data to three agencies so that it can be disseminated on three different nets. In addition, when the data includes a high ordinate, high performance aircraft must be notified which requires disseminating the data to a fourth agency.

5-  
**SECRET**

b. Operations. Artillery Air Warning Notification (Con't)

**OBSERVATION:** Furnishing the data to all these agencies generates an unnecessary delay in firing and seriously hampers the surprise element of artillery fires. Providing firing data to only one aircraft control station would eliminate excess radio transmission and would save time.

c. Training and Organization. None

d. Intelligence. None

e. Logistics. None

f. Other. None

Part 2. Recommendations:

a. H&I Fires. H&I fires planned on a number of coordinates in close proximity to the coordinate listed as the suspect location will provide coverage in depth and width of the area and afford a greater chance of disrupting operations there. A systematic program of attacking targets on an area basis, in this manner, should cause the VC not just to move out of the way of the artillery, but to leave the area altogether.

b. Aircraft Control Stations. It is recommended that the aircraft control stations be MACV operated. Since ARVN as well as US units use artillery, the coordinating centers would be manned by MACV personnel. In addition ARVN pilots would then have access to the information of artillery firing which they do not now have. Data required by the pilots is the location from which the artillery is being fired, the direction of fire, the range to the next thousand meters (for safety), the inclusive time of firing, and the maximum ordinate in feet computed from sea level.

*Louis W. Haskell*  
LOUIS W. HASKELL  
Lt Col, Arty  
Commanding

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

7

W 12 (12 Nov 60)

1st Ind

Subject: Quarterly Operational Report (4)

Re: 54th Artillery Group, APO San Francisco 96257

To: Commanding Officer  
11 Field Force Vietnam Artillery  
ATTN: AVFD-FAC  
APO San Francisco 96200

1.(a) Forwarded for consideration.

2.(d) The Commander's observations and recommendations are considered adequate and valid. The artillery air warning procedure has been changed to require only one notification by the firing unit.

*Charles M. Mizell*  
CHARLES M. MIZELI  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

3 years and 2 year intervals  
4 years and 3 years  
5 years and 2 years

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

II FFORCEV  
S. 1712

9

AVFB-FACO (12 Nov 66) 2nd Ind (C)  
SUBJECT: Quarterly Operational Report (U)

22 NOV 1966

DA, HQ, II FFORCEV ARTY, APO 96266

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVC-DH, APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GPDP-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report submitted by the 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery is considered adequate.

2. (U) Reference Section II, Part 2a; concur.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part 2b; nonconcur. The responsibility for broadcasting notifications of artillery fires must rest with the US commander having the responsibility for the TAOR/AO from which the artillery is firing. A new regulation on this subject is presently being published by HQ, II FFORCEV. This regulation makes provisions for broadcasting notifications of ARVN artillery fires as well as US. The requirement to notify pilots of artillery firing is not intended in any way to delay the delivery of artillery fires in support of units in contact or on immediate type targets. The 2/35 Arty has been so informed.

4. (U) The overall classification of the ORLL should be SECRET because of the information contained in Section I, para 1c (3). The 2/35 Arty has been instructed to upgrade all copies of this report to SECRET.

Classified at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years  
GPO 5200.10

7

*George R. Allin, Jr.*  
GEORGE R. ALLIN, Jr.  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

**SECRET**

03-S-87 241

II FFA  
LOG NO. 5-1233-66  
Copy No. 1 of 1

C. J.

**SECRET**

11  
AVFBC-N (22 Nov 66) 3rd Ind (CJ)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October  
1966, RCS-CSFOR-65 (U)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266

8 JAN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATT: AVC-DH, APO 96307

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-MH, APO 96588

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the  
Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 2D  
Newitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery for the quarter ending 31 October  
1966 is considered adequate and is forwarded herewith.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and the 1st  
and 2nd Ind. Concur with the comments and action taken as stated in  
the basic report and 1st and 2nd Ind.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
nc

  
WAYNE D. BLANTON  
WO.W1, USA  
Acting Asst AG

2702658

AVC-67-S 241

CS-2-67 241

**SECRET**

13

**SECRET**

AVHOC-BN (31 Oct 66) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS GEFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 21 JAN 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-OT  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery as indorsed.

2. Concur with the basic report as modified by the previous indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. J. THORNTON  
1st Lt. AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

1. This report is for internal use only.  
2. This report is for internal use only.  
3. This report is for internal use only.

63-2-67 241

9

62

**SECRET**

ARV675-290

COPY 1 OF 5 COMES  
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



15  
**SECRET**

GPOP-OT (31 Oct 66)

5th Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 2d How Bn, 35th Arty

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 20 FEB 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
ROBERT L. BUNCH  
Lt Col, AGC  
Asst AG

Declassified at 2 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years  
Declassified

10

**SECRET**

RBI  
2702658

HQ  
S-67 616

63-8-87

241